ḥeleḳ 1. Musar ʻatsot ṿe-hanhagot -- ḥeleḳ 2. Musre haśkel ba-Torah -- ḥeleḳ 3. Ḥidushim u-veʼurim ba-Shas.

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “xisφing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “xisφing” is true when what is happening withxis such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies (...) itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “xisφing” describesx's intentional action, it is true iffxis acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon‐copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies. (shrink)

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

This article analyzes the distinctive forms that collective memories take in the age of globalization. It studies the transition from national to cosmopolitan memory cultures. Cosmopolitanism refers to a process of `internal globalization' through which global concerns become part of local experiences of an increasing number of people. Global media representations, among others, create new cosmopolitan memories, providing new epistemological vantage points and emerging moral-political interdependencies. The article traces the historical roots of this transformation and outlines the theoretical foundations for (...) the emergence of cosmopolitan memories through an examination of how the Holocaust has been remembered in Germany, Israel and the USA in the course of the last fifty years. It is precisely the abstract nature of `good and evil' that symbolizes the Holocaust, which contributes to the extra-territorial quality of cosmopolitan memory. As such, memories of the Holocaust contribute to the creation of a common European cultural memory. (shrink)

A simple noncommutative probability theory is presented, and two examples for the difference between that theory and the classical theory are shown. The first example is the well-known formulation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in terms of a variance inequality and the second example is an interpretatio of the Bell paradox in terms of noncommuntative probability.

This paper disucsses the Boolean algebraic axiomatic system of situations suggested by the Polish logician Roman Suszko (1919-1979). The paper will specifically examine the adequacy of the axioms, definitions and theorems of Suszko’s system as a model for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus. It will be shown how the formal properties of Suszko’s system - the atomicity and completeness of the Boolean algebraic system - can be employed in order to clarify key concepts of the situational part of the Tractarian ontology. (...) After considering the formal reconstruction of the Tractarian concepts of teh world and logical space, a controversial issue pertaining to necessary facts in the Tracatus will be addressed. This will be followed by a formal clarification of the Tractarian concepts of logical place and possible worlds, the latter being identified as combinations of states and affairs, which are, according to the Tractarian ontology, the simplest kinds of situations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance will be considered. The (...) latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume connects the philosophy of history to moral philosophy with a unique focus on time. Taking in a range of intellectual traditions, cultural, and geographical contexts, the volume provides a rich tapestry of approaches to time, morality, culture, and history. -/- By extending the philosophical discussion on the ethical importance of temporality, the editors disentangle some of the disciplinary tensions between analytical and hermeneutic philosophy of history, cultural theory, meta-ethical theory, and normative ethics. The ethical and existential character (...) of temporality reveals itself within a collection that resists the methodological underpinnings of any one philosophical school. The book's distinctive cross-cultural approach ensures a wide range of perspectives with contributions on life and death in Japanese philosophy, ethics and time in Maori philosophy, non-traditional temporalities and philosophical anthropology, as well as global approaches to ethics. -/- These new directions of study highlight the importance of the ethical in the temporal, inviting further points of departure in this burgeoning field. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the theoretical foundations of collective interest in the sufferings of strangers. Concern with the suffering of others, accompanied by the urge to help, is compassion. This study develops the social and historical conditions under which public compassion emerges. Two broad interpretations of these developments are suggested. The democratization perspective suggests that with the lessening of profoundly categorical and corporate social distinctions, compassion becomes more extensive. A second perspective is linked to the emergence of market society. By defining (...) a universal field of others with whom contracts and exchanges can be made, market perspectives extend the sphere of moral concern as well: however unintentionally. Public compassion is part of the language of modernity. This gives compassion the possibility to be also part of a newly emerging ‘Second Modernity’. (shrink)

This article brings out ethical aspects arising in Plato’s classical critique of narrative and imitative art in The Republic, especially when it comes to reading stories about the past. Socrates’s and Glaucon’s most important suggestion, I argue, is to cultivate an ethical consciousness where one ought to see the distinctions between how the real and the imaginary in narratives are to be conceived, and what that insight ethically demands of the reader. Taken as an ethical insight for the reader when (...) engaging in narrative understanding, this should be to resist the temptation to think that past suffering and misery as told in a story can be read analogously to narratives having a tragic plot. The article clarifies the meaning of Plato’s critique through the ideas of Simone Weil, Emmanuel Lévinas and Iris Murdoch. These existential moral philosophers work towards having an ethical consciousness in one’s personal relationship with stories of our lifeworld. (shrink)

Philosophers of logic are particularly interested in understanding the aims, epistemology, and methodology of logic. This raises the question of how the philosophy of logic should go about these enquires. According to the practice-based approach, the most reliable method we have to investigate the methodology and epistemology of a research field is by considering in detail the activities of its practitioners. This holds just as true for logic as it does for the recognised empirical and abstract sciences. If we wish (...) to systematically understand the aims and epistemology of logic, we are best placed achieving this by looking at what logicians do, rather than reflecting upon the nature of logic itself. In this entry, we outline the motivations for a practice-based approach towards the philosophy of logic and highlight its advantages over more “top-down” approaches, which attempt to infer conclusions about the nature of logic and its methodology on the basis of traditional assumptions about knowledge, metaphysics, or logic itself. We end by addressing several prominent concerns raised against the practice-based approach. (shrink)

This study aims to examine how service employees’ perceptions of corporate social responsibility affect their creativity at work and its mediated link through compassion at work and their intrinsic motivation. Working with a sample of 250 hotel employees in South Korea, structural equation modeling is employed to test research hypotheses. The results of this research suggest that employees’ perceptions of CSR are positively related to employee creativity. Second, compassion at work mediated the positive relationship between employees’ perceptions of CSR and (...) creativity. Third, employees’ intrinsic motivation also mediated the positive relationship between employees’ perceptions of CSR and employee creativity. Finally, the relationship between employees’ perceptions of CSR and employee creativity is sequentially and fully mediated by compassion at work and their intrinsic motivation. The theoretical and managerial implications of the results and limitations of the study are discussed, and future research directions are suggested. (shrink)

This essay concerns what it means to historicize evil in an ethically responsible way: that is, what it means to think and narrate perpetrators and victims of evil through what is testified to and told about them. I show that a responsible gaze can only be recognized by allowing ourselves to be addressed by the dead victims. The argument consists in an existential critique of a set of common ideas in the human sciences, which suggest that we must attempt to (...) empathize with the perpetrators in order to understand their deeds in human terms. This empathetic thought, I suggest, easily leads us either to aestheticize the victims or to think that the evils in our history should be addressed as a metaphysical susceptibility to evil internal to being human. By critically discussing these ideas, I show that empathy for the perpetrators in several respects does injustice to the dead victims, which marks that we as their afterlife continue to have an irresponsible relationship with the dead. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Partindo da noção de discurso de Michel Foucault buscamos pontuar os efeitos das falas comumente admitidas sobre o(a) professor(a) nos meios sociais e as formas como essas falas corroboram a instituição da figura do(a) bom(boa) professor(a). Para tanto recorremos aos textos publicados na seção "Obrigado, professor" da revista Nova Escola, sobre os quais empreendemos nossa análise.

No Tratado político, Espinosa, ao primeiro movimento do texto, faz dura crítica àqueles que criaram utopias ao tratarem da política. Tais filósofos, afirma, por tomarem os homens não pelo que são, mas pelo que gostariam que fossem, conceberam uma forma de política que nunca pôde ser posta em aplicação. Tese muito próxima à de Maquiavel, presente em O Príncipe, segundo a qual, para escrever coisa útil neste campo, deve-se ir direto alla verità effettuale della cosa che alla immaginazione di essa. (...) Não casualmente, portanto, no Capítulo V do Tratado político, último parágrafo, Espinosa usa os termos ‘agudíssimo’ e ‘prudentíssimo’ ao se referir ao florentino. Há mais Maquiavel em Espinosa para além das citações elogiosas? O artigo procurará tratar desta questão ao mostrar alguns traços comuns às respectivas filosofias políticas. Ao que indicam as fontes primárias e alguns comentadores, Espinosa teria se apropriado, e reconceitualizado, à sua maneira, teses-chave do florentino para escrever suas obras, em particular o Tratado político. (shrink)

No primeiro movimento o artigo analisa, em panorama, a ontologia espinosana. Após, mostra como, do interior dos conceitos presentes na ontologia, derivam os de homem, desejo, alegria e tristeza, esperança e medo, segurança e desespero, ação e paixão. Da relação entre ontologia, homens e desejo – bem como dos demais afetos –, são extraídas, em breves considerações, algumas teses políticas de Espinosa. Levanta-se, neste movimento argumentativo, a hipótese de que as teses políticas espinosanas derivam de sua ontologia e de sua (...) concepção de homem como desejo e variação de potência. O conceito de desejo é analisado à luz da variação de potência e do tema do direito natural, o qual, em Espinosa, se identifica a potência. Quando das breves derivações à política, algumas teses hobbesianas – relacionadas aos temas da multidão, povo, representação, direito natural, estado civil, etc. – são trazidas à argumentação para que se mostre, por contraste, o peso das inovações espinosanas. (shrink)

Este artigo investe na ideia de que a infância é um dispositivo histórico do poder. Tem-se como referência analítica Michel Foucault, que concebe a noção de dispositivo em suas discussões a respeito da sexualidade. A hipótese geradora é a de que, a partir do momento em que a criança se torna um dos grupos estratégicos do dispositivo da sexualidade, produz-se sobre ela um conjunto heterogêneo de regimes de verdades e práticas que configura uma maneira de ser e ter uma infância, (...) influindo significativamente nas perspectivas pedagógicas modernas. Dialogando com Deleuze, Agamben e Veyne, considera-se que todo dispositivo possui: linhas de visibilidade e de enunciação que são, respectivamente, máquinas de “fazer ver” e de “fazer falar” ; linhas de força, que sustentam os campos de visibilidade e os regimes de enunciabilidade; e linhas de subjetivação que são, segundo Deleuze a dimensão do “si próprio” e que configuram o sujeito infantil. Apresenta-se três grupos de práticas articuladas às estas características do dispositivo: as práticas pedagógicas, as práticas divisórias e identitárias de gênero e de sexualidade e as práticas médicas. Observa-se que, para Foucault, o dispositivo da sexualidade disciplina os corpos, regula e normatiza a população, regulamenta o prazer e os saberes sobre o sexo, e, além disso, ocupa-se, por meio desse regime sobre o sexo, da preservação da espécie humana. A infância como dispositivo, na perspectiva ora apresentada neste artigo, também regulamenta a criança, constituindo-a em “sujeito infantil”, estabelecendo uma pedagogia e uma ciência que compuseram o pensamento pedagógico moderno sobre e para infância, ocupando-se também da preservação e da manutenção dessa espécie outra, a criança. Palavras-chave: Infância. Educação. Foucault. Dispositivo. (shrink)

With the six volumes of the Writings edited by the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University since 1982, the monumental work of Charles S. Peirce has finally received the care, respect, and love that it deserves. The sixth volume, object of attention of this review, represents a thorough selection and edition of Peirce's writings from 1886 to 1890.

This investigation concerns first what Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricœur consider to be «the question of writing» in Plato’s Phaedrus, and then whether their conception of a general philosophical problem of writing finds support in the dialogue. By contrast to their attempts to «determine» the «status» of writing as the general condition of knowledge, my investigation has two objections. (1) To show that Plato’s concern is not to define writing, but to reflect on what is involved in honest and dishonest (...) inquiry. (2) To argue that Derrida’s and Ricœur’s determination of the instrumental (epistemic and moral) «status» of writing, overlooks crucial difficulties of dishonest writing that Plato’s discussion of the pharmakon reveals. The argument proposed is that honest and dishonest inquiry is not tied to the moral status that writing, as an invention or instrument, unconditionally involves, but to the moral quality of what a human being does when inquiring. (shrink)

I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.

Many of our hermeneutic, literary critic, and poststructuralist ideas on mediation imply that the medium determines how a textual or narrative account must be taken. In contrast to these, Émmanuel Lévinas suggests that responsibility for the other person is not determined by the medium. Responsibility is already established in proximity to the other person; a relationship that we as moral subjects need to ethically understand. In relation to Primo Levi’s memoir of survival in Auschwitz, If this is a Man, this (...) article show in what ways Slavoj Žižek’s and Hayden White’s aesthetic ideas on mediation make us unprepared to take on the responsibility for the other person that Lévinas shows us. (shrink)

This article conceptualizes the lofty term of cosmopolitanism from people's historical experience. It attempts to find a bridge between theory and life. Many writers now maintain that cosmopolitanism is no longer a dream, but rather the substance of social reality - and that it is increasingly the nation-state and our particular identities that are figments of our imagination, clung to by our memories. The aim of this article is to concretize this argument and demonstrate how some of the Jewish intellectuals (...) who emerged from World War II and the Holocaust argued passionately about the status of their Jewishness and how this related to abstract and universal ideals of modernity and human rights. The article focuses on Hannah Arendt's responses to her critics instead of her vast theoretical work to illustrate this point. In responding to her critics, Arendt came closest to providing a formula for a concept of cosmopolitanism, which attempts to square the circle between the universal and the particular. (shrink)

According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...) motivation for it is the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one’s pleasures. (shrink)